• The space shuttle uses 5 computers for flight control. The first 4 run a primary flight control system. The fifth computer runs a separate flight control program, and is only used in the most dire emergencies. The 4 redundant systems will operate separately, then compare outputs. These should be identical, but in the event of disagreement, they can vote a conflicting system out.
13.1.1 A Mobile Service Robot for the Space Station[an error occurred while processing this directive]
• There is also a scheme for estimating when a system has erred. This is based on a bottom up approach where the checks for errors are made in the specific modules, and then error reports are propagated up to the high level software/hardware. The diagram below depicts the system used in the SSRM.
13.1.2 Case Studies In Failure[an error occurred while processing this directive]
• In basic terms the mission had to be aborted as a result of an oxygen tank rupture. The fact that the astronauts managed to return back safely is a tribute to the quality of design in the space program.
oxygen tanks that supplied breathing air and fuel cells were not draining properly. This was overcome by turning on heat, and redraining the tanks. No action was taken because the performance was adequate. It is believed that a problem arose at this point where insulation on wires inside the tank was worn down because of overheating, and the slower drain of oxygen from the tank.
• The Challenger accident would have been prevented with the existing NASA procedures. The explosion of the Challenger is more the result of management failure in NASA and Morton Thiokol than the result of technical failures.
1977-78: An engineer discovers during tests that under pressure the joints rotated significantly causing the secondary o-ring to become ineffective. This is a result of the elongated joint to hold the secondary o-ring. Morton Thiokol management did not recognize the problem.
1980: The joint is classified on the CIL (Critical Item List) as 1R, indicating that failure would be catastrophic, but there is a redundant o-ring to act as a backup in the event of failure. This was only one of 700 items listed as criticality 1.
After a few flights, problems with the o-rings were noted, as were other items. The normal procedure was to assign a problem tracking number, and examine the causes. This was not done for the o-ring problem. Eventually the problem was recognized and the rating was changed to 1 on the CIL. It was shown that despite NASA’s reclassification, the system was still listed as 1R in the Morton Thiokol paperwork, as well as a number of other documents. Also, Morton Thiokol disagreed with the criticality change, and went to a referee procedure.
1984: the erosion of the o-rings has become a significant concern, and review procedures are requested for the packing of the o-ring joint with the asbestos filled putty that prevents heating of the rings. Morton Thiokol responds with a letter suggesting that higher pressures used in testing the joints was resulting in channels in the putty, and increased erosion of the o-rings. statistics from before and after the change in testing pressure seemed to confirm this. Morton Thiokol recommends continuing the tests to ensure sealing despite the problems, and begins investigating the effects of the testing on the putty.
Jan 1985: A launch of a space shuttle at the coldest temperatures to date leads to the greatest failure of the o-rings to date. The o-rings will deform under pressure to seal the gap, but this is hindered when they are colder, and the material stiffer.
Jan-April 1985: Continued flights and investigations show continued problems with the o-rings, and a relationship to launch temperature. Morton Thiokol acknowledges the problem, and the effects of temperature, but concludes that the second o-ring will ensure safety.
April 1985: the primary o-ring does not seal, and the secondary ring carries the pressure, with some blowby (i.e., the backup was starting to fail). As a result a committee concludes that the shuttle must only be operated in an acceptable flight envelope for the o-ring seal. This report is received by Morton Thiokol, but does not seem to be properly distributed. The problem was also not properly reported within NASA to upper management.
August 1985: Morton Thiokol and NASA managers brief NASA headquarters on the o-ring problems, with a recommendation to continue flights, but step up investigations. A Morton Thiokol task force is set up.
December 1985: One Thiokol engineer suggests stopping shipments of SRBs until the problem is fixed. Thiokol writes a memo to NASA suggesting that the problem tracking of the o-rings be discontinued. This lead to an erroneous listing of the problem as closed, meaning that it would not be considered as critical during launch.
Jan 1986: The space shuttle Challenger is prepared to launch Jan., 22, originally it was scheduled for July 1985, and postponed 3 times, and scrubbed once. It was rescheduled again to the 23rd, then 25th, then 27th, then 28th. This was a result of weather, equipment, scheduling, and other problems.
Jan., 27th, 1986: The shuttle begins preparation for launch the next day, despite predicted temperatures below freezing (26°F) at launch time. Thiokol engineers express concerns over low temperatures, and suggests NASA managers be notified (this was not done). A minimum launch temperature of 53°F had been suggested to NASA. There was no technical opinion supporting the launch at this point. The NASA representative discussing the launch objected to Thiokol’s engineers opinions, and accused them of changing their opinions. Upper management became involved with the process, and “convinced” the technical staff to withdraw objections to the launch. Management at Thiokol gave the go ahead to launch under pressure from NASA officials (this was the critical decision).
the shuttle is wheeled out to the launch pad. Rain has frozen on the launch pad, and may have gotten into the SRB joints and frozen there also.
11:39 am: The engines are ignited, and a puff of black smoke can be seen blowing from the right SRB. As the shuttle rises the gas can be seen blowing by the o-rings. The vibrations experienced in the first 30 seconds of flight are the worst encountered to date.
13.1.3 Glossary[an error occurred while processing this directive]
13.1.4 References and Bibliography[an error occurred while processing this directive]